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The World Bank’s Universal Health Coverage Studies Series (UNICO) 
 
All people aspire to receive quality, affordable health care. In recent years, this aspiration has 
spurred calls for universal health coverage (UHC) and has given birth to a global UHC 
movement. In 2005, this movement led the World Health Assembly to call on governments to 
“develop their health systems, so that all people have access to services and do not suffer 
financial hardship paying for them.” In December 2012, the movement prompted the United 
Nations General Assembly to call on governments to “urgently and significantly scale-up efforts 
to accelerate the transition towards universal access to affordable and quality healthcare 
services.” Today, some 30 middle-income countries are implementing programs that aim to 
advance the transition to UHC, and many other low- and middle-income countries are 
considering launching similar programs. 
 
The World Bank supports the efforts of countries to share prosperity by transitioning toward 
UHC with the objectives of improving health outcomes, reducing the financial risks associated 
with ill health, and increasing equity. The Bank recognizes that there are many paths toward 
UHC and does not endorse a particular path or set of organizational or financial arrangements to 
reach it. Regardless of the path chosen, successful implementation requires that many 
instruments and institutions be in place. While different paths can be taken to expand coverage, 
all paths involve implementation challenges. With that in mind, the World Bank launched the 
Universal Health Coverage Studies Series (UNICO Study Series) to develop knowledge and 
operational tools designed to help countries tackle these implementation challenges in ways that 
are fiscally sustainable and that enhance equity and efficiency. The UNICO Studies Series 
consists of technical papers and country case studies that analyze different issues related to the 
challenges of UHC policy implementation. 
 
The case studies in the series are based on the use of a standardized protocol to analyze the nuts 
and bolts of programs that have expanded coverage from the bottom up—programs that have 
started with the poor and vulnerable rather than those initiated in a trickle-down fashion. The 
protocol consists of nine modules with over 300 questions that are designed to elicit a detailed 
understanding of how countries are implementing five sets of policies to accomplish the 
following: (a) manage the benefits package, (b) manage processes to include the poor and 
vulnerable, (c) nudge efficiency reforms to the provision of care, (d) address new challenges in 
primary care, and (e) tweak financing mechanisms to align the incentives of different 
stakeholders in the health sector. To date, the nuts and bolts protocol has been used for two 
purposes: to create a database comparing programs implemented in different countries, and to 
produce case studies of programs in 24 developing countries and one high-income “comparator,” 
the state of Massachusetts in the United States. The protocol and case studies are being published 
as part of the UNICO Studies Series, and a comparative analysis will be available in 2013. 
 
We trust that the protocol, case studies, and technical papers will provide UHC implementers 
with an expanded toolbox, make a contribution to discussions about UHC implementation, and 
that they will inform the UHC movement as it continues to expand worldwide. 
 
Daniel Cotlear 
UNICO Studies Series Task Team Leader 
The World Bank 
Washington, DC 
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Executive Summary 
 
India’s health sector continues to be challenged by overall low levels of public financing, 
entrenched accountability issues in the public delivery system, and the persistent dominance of 
out-of-pocket spending. In this context, this case study describes three recent initiatives 
introduced by the central and state governments in India, aimed at addressing some of these 
challenges and improving the availability of and access to health services, particularly for the 
poor and vulnerable groups in the country. This includes two federal schemes introduced by the 
Government of India—the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) of the Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare and the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) of the Ministry of Labor 
and Employment—and the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme launched by the state government of 
Andhra Pradesh. The three schemes discussed in this case study were designed and implemented 
by different agencies almost in parallel, over the same time period, and used different financing 
and delivery approaches. A discussion of the mechanics and operational features of these 
programs has been undertaken to unravel the underlying complexities, interactions, and 
interdependencies of these programs within the country’s health system. 
 
Introduced in 2005, the NRHM has led to several service delivery innovations and to significant, 
though still inadequate, increases in central government investments in health, especially for 
public health interventions and primary care. Since 2007, the new wave of Government 
Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes (GSHISs), such as RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri, has 
introduced a new set of arrangements to govern, allocate, and manage the use of public resources 
for health, including an explicit (and delivered) package of services, greater accountability for 
delivering services, and a bottom-up design to reach universal coverage by first achieving 
coverage of the poor. Targeting is, however, not without its challenges, and incidence of false 
positives and false negatives may be high, but this targeting is managed largely outside the 
domain and influence of these health programs. Nevertheless, the bottom-up design for 
expansion of health coverage, starting with coverage of the rural and the poorest segments of the 
population first, and the rapid scale-up of population coverage in a short period of time, are 
unique facets of the “India story.” 
 
Several achievements of these programs are unprecedented and have far-reaching implications. 
NRHM, for example, managed to create significant flexibility in financial management rules for 
the public health system—the financial autonomy to retain and flexibly spend funds at public 
health facilities is unique in the country’s public financial management system. GSHISs have 
enabled the purchasing of health services from the private sector at a scale never before seen.  
 
However, the early successes of these programs have not been without their share of challenges, 
and the unfinished agenda remains. For example, not much progress has been made toward 
performance-based payments or alignment of incentives for mainstream health sector workers. 
Several operational, capacity, and monitoring challenges surround all programs. Coordination 
among the programs is not common, and often linkages to the wider health system are weak or 
even absent. Debate continues about whether the country can continue with expansion on both 
the supply and demand side in the long term, the prioritization of investments between primary 
and inpatient care, and between the extension of population coverage versus expansion of the 
benefits package, especially when resources are limited. 
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The areas of focus of each of the three schemes discussed in this case study are clearly 
delineated—primary care in the case of NRHM, secondary care in the case of RSBY, and tertiary 
care in the case of Rajiv Aarogyasri. Although this distinction in focus was due to their 
respective evolutionary factors and was not planned, an interesting complementarity exists. Thus, 
if these programs could further evolve in close coordination and with similarly defined 
populations covered, and with smooth linkages, they could potentially contribute to seamless, 
comprehensive coverage for primary, secondary, and tertiary care, drawing upon their respective 
strengths and synergies. 
 
There is considerable scope, for example, for NRHM-strengthened primary care facilities serving 
as effective gatekeepers for the secondary and tertiary health insurance programs and for 
contributing to effective follow-up care after these patients are discharged. Preventive 
interventions and effective case management for noncommunicable diseases at the primary care 
level will contain costs for inpatient programs. The lessons from the demand-side financing 
schemes in aligning facility-level incentives for inpatient care can be used to introduce a 
performance-based remuneration system for public facilities providing primary care. Together, 
this could be the promising foundation for a reformed health finance and delivery system, 
catapulting forward India’s march toward universal health coverage. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite its relatively large disease burden of communicable and noncommunicable diseases 
(MOHFW 2005a; WHO 2010), India has traditionally been a low spender on health care, 
allocating approximately 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), or US$40 per capita in 
2008–09 (MOHFW 2009).3 In terms of India’s share of global health expenditure, the country, 
with over 16 percent of the world’s population, manages with less than 1 percent of the world’s 
total health expenditure. The share of health spending has also not kept pace with the country’s 
dynamic economic growth in the first decade of this millennium4 (India’s total health spending 
accounted for a much higher 4.8 percent of GDP in 2001–02 and has reduced its share since 
then). Public spending on health as a share of GDP has varied little over the same decade, 
hovering at about 1 percent, even though policy pronouncements have sought to raise this share 
for several years. Government (central, state, and local) is the source of about one-fifth of 
spending, while out-of-pocket payments represent about 70 percent—one of the highest 
percentages in the world,5 impoverishing an estimated 63 million Indians every year (Berman 
Ahuja, and Bhandari 2010).  
 
India is significantly below its global comparators in terms of public expenditure on health as a 
share of GDP among countries with similar levels of income (GDP per capita in current U.S. 
dollars). At its current level of income, most countries exhibit higher public spending on health 
as a share of their GDP than India. India also falls short in terms of health impact achieved from 
its health spending. Compared to the country’s level of income and total health spending per 
capita, India has not performed as well as its income comparators on lowering maternal 
mortality, and performance is just about average for infant mortality (La Forgia and Nagpal 
2012). Large disparities in health outcomes are still evident across states and social groups, and 
improvements have not been shared equally. Public subsidies for health disproportionately favor 
the richer segments of society (Mahal et al. 2002). Peters et al. (2002) estimated that in the late 
1990s, for every 1 rupee spent on the poorest income quintile, the government spent an estimated 
3 rupees on the richest quintile. Budgets bear little or no relation to volume, quality, or efficiency 
of care. Staffing and budget norms—often related to civil service, budgetary legislation, or 
public health codes—restrict managers’ freedom to marshal resources to improve quality or 
achieve efficiency. 
In theory, the public health system of the country does provide comprehensive, full-spectrum 
health services, and is open to everyone at free or near-free pricing. However, it is also a fact that 
an overwhelming 80 percent of ambulatory care and as much as 60 percent of inpatient care 
continues to be obtained outside the public health system. Considerable inter-state variation 
exists, especially in inpatient utilization (Mahal, et al., 2001) and there are significant sub-
national disparities across various dimensions of vulnerability. The publicly financed, owned and 
delivered health service is also the single largest health sector subsystem, where each state runs 
its own providers and infrequently purchases services from others. Though higher facilities are 
designated as referral facilities, the gatekeeping and referral systems are not strong and even 
tertiary hospitals receive a large number of primary care cases in their outpatient facilities. 
                                                                
3 Provisional estimations from 2005–06 to 2008–09. 
4 However, the literature on the income elasticity of health spending being above one is not very conclusive. 
5 Among Asian countries, this was exceeded only by Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan in 2008 
(World Health Statistics 2010).  
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It is within this context, and given the current structure of the country’s health system as 
discussed in detail at Annex 1, that this case study describes three recent initiatives introduced in 
the last few years by the central and state governments in India, aimed at addressing some of 
these health system challenges and improving the availability of and access to health services, 
particularly for the poor and vulnerable groups in the country. This includes two federal schemes 
introduced by the Government of India—the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) of the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) and the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) of the Ministry of Labor and Employment—and the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme launched 
by the state government of Andhra Pradesh. NRHM is the flagship initiative of the MOHFW and 
represents MOHFW’s efforts to rejuvenate and reshape state health systems, aimed at 
strengthening India’s public health delivery infrastructure and improving service delivery, 
especially in rural areas and with a focus on primary care. In contrast, RSBY and Rajiv 
Aarogyasri are demand-side schemes aimed at improving public purchasing of inpatient services 
for the poor and are focused on providing secondary and tertiary care, respectively. 
 
Taken together, the bottom-up approach of prioritizing coverage and financial protection for 
vulnerable beneficiaries first, innovative design features of the programs, and the successes and 
challenges of these new schemes, and the apparent dichotomy in financing approaches (supply 
side versus demand side), with yet the potential complementarity in focus, creates a unique 
Indian story—one that appears to provide a promising foundation for a reformed health finance 
and delivery system. 
 
The remainder of this case study on India’s march toward universal health coverage focuses on 
three recent, prominent programs, and includes a discussion on the institutional structure of these 
programs and their interactions within the country’s health system, their mechanisms for 
beneficiary targeting and enrolment, the benefits packages covered by them, accompanying 
innovations in public financial management, and their information environment. Annex 1 
presents an overview of the health system and health financing in India, and Annex 2 discusses 
the evolutionary context of India’s Government Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes. The 
discussion of the mechanics and operational features of these programs has been undertaken to 
unravel the underlying complexities, interactions, and interdependencies within these programs. 
The case study also aims to contribute to the ongoing debate within the Indian health sector, with 
opinions divided between investments in traditional input-based health spending for publicly 
managed health facilities versus demand-side financing, purchasing of care, and involving 
private providers and intermediaries in delivering services financed by public money. The  case 
study also aims to share how the lessons learned by one program can be applicable more widely 
within the Indian health system and beyond. 
 
2. Overview of the Three Schemes included in this Case Study 
 
India’s health sector continues to be challenged by overall low levels of public financing, 
entrenched accountability issues in the public delivery system, and the persistent dominance of 
out-of-pocket spending. Introduced in 2005, the NRHM has led to several service delivery 
innovations and to significant, though still inadequate, increases in central government 
investments in health, especially for public health interventions and primary care. Since 2007, 
the new wave of Government Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes (GSHISs) has introduced a 
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new set of arrangements to govern, allocate, and manage the use of public resources for health, 
including an explicit (and delivered) package of services, greater accountability for delivering 
services, and a bottom-up design to reach universal coverage by first achieving coverage of the 
poor. Exemplified by the RSBY and RA, this new crop of GSHISs, over a dozen at last count, 
covers over 300 million Indians today, focused on inpatient care. The three schemes discussed in 
this case study were designed and implemented by different agencies almost in parallel, over the 
same time period, and used different financing and delivery approaches. Yet, they have a 
complementarity in the focus of their benefits package that seems to have been more by accident 
than design, possibly emerging because the need for additional coverage was more visible 
among, and more acutely felt by, the poor seeking inpatient care. 
 
Consequent to a report by the National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (MOHFW 
2005b), which reemphasized the importance of investments in health toward achieving economic 
and social development, the MOHFW launched the first of these three programs, the National 
Rural Health Mission (NRHM), in 2005. The NRHM aimed at increasing investments in 
strengthening the public health care delivery system. The plan of action included (a) increasing 
public expenditure on health, (b) reducing regional imbalance in publicly operated health 
delivery infrastructure, (c) pooling of resources, (d) integration of organizational structures, (e) 
decentralization and district management of national health programs, (f) increasing community 
participation and ownership of assets, and (g) induction of management and financial personnel 
into the district health system. 
 
NRHM is an umbrella program that has placed a major emphasis on the horizontal integration of 
hitherto vertical disease control and reproductive and child health programs. In addition to its 
efforts to pool and integrate the resources of these programs, it has also brought new investments 
in the publicly operated health delivery system. It has provided flexibility around hiring 
contractual staff for public facilities, promoted supply chain reforms, introduced a cadre of 
grassroots workers paid entirely based on performance, and introduced elements of financial 
autonomy at the health facility level. It has also innovated on financial flow mechanisms and 
introduced a conditional cash transfer scheme for improving institutional deliveries. 
 
The second scheme in this case study, RSBY, was introduced by the Government of India’s 
Ministry of Labor and Employment in 2008. In contrast to NRHM, this is a demand-side 
financing scheme that purchases health insurance coverage capped at 30,000 rupees (US$600) 
per family per year, for inpatient treatment (primarily secondary care). By September 2012, 
RSBY had enrolled over 32 million families who became eligible for inpatient treatment in more 
than 10,000 hospitals across the country included in RSBY’s network. 
 
The third scheme, also a demand-side scheme akin to RSBY, was introduced in 2007 in the state 
of Andhra Pradesh in India. This scheme, “Rajiv Aarogyasri,” focuses primarily on tertiary 
coverage, paying for the treatment of serious and life-threatening ailments for 20.4 million 
families across the state, comprising all poor families and a significant segment of the lower-
middle class in the state. Over the last five years, several other states (including Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Gujarat) have launched their own tertiary-care programs modeled 
on the Rajiv Aarogyasri scheme, with some state-specific differences in their design and 
implementation arrangements. 
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3. Institutional Architecture of the Programs  
 
The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) is the Government of India’s umbrella health 
sector program, and it complements and works through the state government-run primary health 
care system. NRHM places a major emphasis on the horizontal integration of hitherto vertical 
public health programs as envisaged under the National Health Policy 2002. In a context where 
the country’s constitution lays out health as being a subject for state governments, NRHM 
supplements and strengthens the state-owned public health systems by providing additional 
resources with a focus on primary care and public health programs. NRHM also leverages this 
financial support to facilitate the creation of institutional mechanisms that enable some degree of 
financial autonomy and a faster flow of funds. 
 
Funds from the finance division of the central Ministry of Health and Family Welfare flow 
through a State Health Society6 created by the health department in each state, and onward to 
similar specially created district-level entities called District Health Societies (figure 1). The new 
investments in primary health have been through financing additional activities beyond those 
included in the previously existing vertical public health programs. While a major part of NRHM 
financing is not new money per se (being a continuation of several decades-old vertical programs 
now consolidated under one umbrella), the remainder is indeed new money, and that coupled 
with flexibility around hiring contractual staff, supply chain reforms, introduction of a cadre of 
grassroots workers paid entirely based on performance, innovative financial flow mechanisms, 
and an overall increased emphasis on public health expenditure, distinguish NRHM from the 
situation prior to its existence. 
   
 
 
  
                                                                
6 The State Health Society is an autonomous entity, which is the nodal agency for implementing NRHM in a given 
state. Although the officials of the state government are also the office bearers of the society in their official 
capacity, this mechanism provides considerable autonomy in decision making and financial flows. 
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 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,  
Government of India 
 
 
 
 Mission Flexible Pool 
• Reproductive and Child Health program 
• Immunization 
• National Disease Control Programs 
• Integrated Disease Surveillance Program 
• Additional activities under NRHM 
 
 State Government-  
health department 
 
 
District health officer and 
district-level health sector 
administration 
 State Health Society 
 District Health Society 
Figure 1 Institutional Architecture of NRHM 
 
As mentioned, RSBY is a demand-side financing scheme that provides health insurance 
coverage capped at 30,000 rupees (US$600) per family per year, for inpatient treatment 
(primarily secondary care). The coverage requires no premium contribution or copayment to be 
made by the beneficiary, and is “cashless”7 in more than 10,000 hospitals networked by the 
scheme across the country. The central coordinating and policy-making agency for RSBY is the 
Government of India’s Ministry of Labour and Employment (MOLE). MOLE plays a major role 
in decisions on scheme structure and implementation, and also drafts standard documents, 
defines operational processes, and monitors implementation. The scheme is implemented at the 
state level through a specially created entity known as the State Nodal Agency (figure 2), which 
is the main supervisory and implementing agency for the scheme at the state level and is 
involved in contracting and monitoring insurance companies in accordance with the guidelines 
issued by MOLE. However, human resource capacity constraints at MOLE and the State Nodal 
                                                                
7 “Cashless” means that the patient need not make any payments to the health providers when receiving services 
covered under the program, and all such payments are directly settled between the program and the hospital. 
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Agencies range from moderate to severe, and often the program functions with core staff 
numbering in the single digits, handling all the functions of a complex program that covers over 
100 million beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 2 Institutional Structure of RSBY 
 
The Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance Scheme provides tertiary-focused coverage 
for the treatment of 938 defined serious and life-threatening ailments for 20.4 million families 
across the state of Andhra Pradesh, comprising all poor families and a significant segment of the 
lower middle class. The Aarogyasri Health Care Trust established by the state government is an 
autonomous, nodal-implementing and oversight agency for this scheme. It is chaired by the chief 
minister and a separate minister, who serves as its vice chairman. The principal secretaries of 
several state government departments are members of the Trust, and the chief executive officer 
of the scheme is the Trust’s secretary. The chief executive officer is empowered by the Trust 
board through resolutions for making policy decisions and, based on these, facilitating 
implementation. 
 
Until 2011, the insurance risk was partly retained by the Trust and partly transferred to an 
insurance company, chosen through a bidding process. In 2012, the scheme moved to a fully 
self-insured model, where it uses insurance intermediaries to manage the scheme but does not 
transfer the risk to a commercial insurer. The governing trust has well over 100 staff members 
Government of 
India- 
Ministry of Labour 
and Employment 
State Nodal 
Agency 
Insurance 
Companies 
Network 
Hospitals 
TPAs and/or 
Smart Card 
Providers 
Field Key Officers District Key Managers 
State Government 
(Labour/Health/ RD) 
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divided across functional lines, and the extended human resource count of the program, 
including its field functionaries, runs into a few thousand full-time staff, providing opportunities 
to undertake governance and implementation actions often not possible in other capacity-
constrained GSHISs elsewhere in the country (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Institutional Structure of Rajiv Aarogyasri 
 
     
    Source: La Forgia and Nagpal 2012. 
 
 
4. Linkages of these Programs with the Country’s Health System 
 
Several of these reforms have far-reaching effects. For example, the financial autonomy to 
receive additional funds at the facility level and to retain it for flexible spending by the facility, 
through the creation and funding of “Patient Welfare Societies”8 or Rogi Kalyan Samiti, in all 
public health facilities, has been instrumental in involving public facilities in public insurance 
schemes such as RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri. It is all the more commendable because such 
financial autonomy for government organizations is unprecedented in any other sector. Likewise, 
NRHM’s creation of a new class of village-level, community-based voluntary health workers 
paid only on a performance basis, called the Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA), has been 
used by several health sector programs that provide incentives to ASHA workers for specific 
health promotion actions or for creating linkages between the community and health facilities. 
By strengthening infrastructure (such as creating 24/7 Primary Health Centres), and also 
providing demand-side incentives for institutional births under the Janani Suraksha Yojana 
                                                                
8 These facility-level societies commenced in states such as Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan well before the 
onset of NRHM, pooling nominal fees levied on the nonpoor availing services at public health facilities and 
channeling the same to improve facility maintenance and drug supplies. NRHM institutionalized the mechanism 
across the country and instituted fixed, annual grants from NRHM for each facility, to supplement any income 
generated at the facility level and aimed at a similar eventual, flexible use. 
Government of 
Andhra 
Pradesh  
Rajiv 
Aarogyasri 
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Public and 
private 
empanelled 
hospitals  
Primary health  
center 
Community 
health center 
Insurer/ TPA 
Aarogya 
Mithras Call center 
Information 
technology 
provider 
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(Maternal Safety Scheme), NRHM has contributed to a steep rise in the share of institutional 
births and thereby to improved reproductive and child health. 
 
Results of initial studies reveal that schemes such as RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri do seem to 
make a credible contribution to the financial protection of their Below the Poverty Line (BPL) 
beneficiaries for the covered inpatient procedures, but they do not cover the frequent, ambulatory 
care episodes at all. In theory, the public health system, strengthened by NRHM, provides free or 
nearly free services that can partially fill these coverage gaps, and these two schemes also 
complement each other in their benefits package offerings. However, the links of the recent 
generation of Indian health insurance schemes, including RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri, to the 
public health system have been variable at best. Even within the health insurance schemes 
themselves, there exist situations where RSBY and the state-funded schemes operate in parallel, 
representing a missed opportunity to synergize and share resources.  
 
It is important to emphasize that despite rapid expansion of population coverage in the last four 
years, these demand-side financing schemes are still small players in the country’s health system. 
RSBY, for instance, constituted less than 0.3 percent of the country’s health expenditure even in 
2011. As such, their ability to bring about drastic changes in the incentive environment of the 
country’s health system is still limited. However, at least in one state (Kerala), RSBY has 
managed to foster competition between public and private providers of hospital services for 
RSBY patients. The public hospital functionaries in Kerala receive a small proportion of the 
insurance payout as incentives, while the rest is used to improve the institution, which has 
translated into large incremental gains for some hospitals in Kerala. However, there is still some 
time before RSBY can similarly attain critical mass in other states and influence the health 
system in a big way. 
 
In the Andhra Pradesh context, Rajiv Aarogyasri is a relatively large player in the health system, 
especially for the 300-odd hospitals in its network. Many of these hospitals have more than 20 
percent (and for some even 70 percent) of all their inpatients being Rajiv Aarogyasri 
beneficiaries. This is understandable given the high share of the state’s population (85 percent) 
being covered under the scheme. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the private health care sector 
has made substantial new investments in Andhra Pradesh in response to the business opportunity 
created by the scheme, with new hospitals, expansion of hospitals, and investments in medical 
equipment. As with other GSHISs, Rajiv Aarogyasri has increased choice for beneficiaries, and 
the continued and increasing use of public hospitals under the scheme may also suggest the 
strengthened ability of public hospitals (at least some tertiary-level public hospitals in the case of 
Rajiv Aarogyasri) to compete with private providers. 
 
5. Targeting, Identification, and Enrolment of Beneficiaries 
 
Targeting, Identification, and Eligibility 
 
In India, the mechanism for defining the poor is housed in the Planning Commission of the 
Government of India. At the state level, the government lists of the poor, called the Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) lists, are established by revenue/food/civil supplies departments (depending 
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on the state) and are also updated by them. States may use more liberal criteria to define the 
poor, and often have larger lists than estimated using Planning Commission criteria. 
 
Poverty is defined in terms of income, and a poverty line is set at the price of food required to 
provide standard caloric values. This varies by geography. These poverty lists established by the 
government are also used by the health schemes, although they do not have much control over 
the methodology or content of the lists. The system is primarily created for access to subsidized 
foodgrains and other supplies such as domestic fuel, and is used for determining eligibility for 
several social sector and welfare schemes, including health sector programs. Since several 
welfare programs are directed at the listed poor, inclusion in the list is desirable and thus little 
social stigma seems to exist on account of being classified as poor (though other stigma factors, 
such as caste, may be prevalent among the BPL population). 
 
Still, these BPL lists are not without their problems, and incidence of false positives and false 
negatives may be high. Jalan and Murgai (2007) compared BPL classification with consumption 
patterns drawn from the household Consumer Expenditure Schedule of the National Sample 
Survey. They found that BPL scores misclassified 49 percent of the nonpoor as poor. The 
misclassification of nonpoor as poor is more prevalent in the richer states. Dreze and Khera 
(2010) performed a similar analysis based on the NSS 61st round (2004–05) and the third 
National Family Health Survey (DLHS-3: 2005–06). Based on a “Wealth Index” created by the 
authors, while only 53 percent and 39 percent of the poorest quintile had BPL cards according to 
the NSS and DLHS-3 data, respectively, so did nearly 18 percent of the richest. Targeting is, 
thus, not without its challenges, but is managed largely outside the domain and influence of these 
health programs. 
 
RSBY follows the Planning Commission methodology and its estimates for the number of poor, 
to determine the number of BPL beneficiaries eligible under the scheme in each state. As of 
September 2012, the scheme covered about 100 million beneficiaries. In the case of Rajiv 
Aarogyasri, not unlike other state-level GSHISs, the scheme uses more liberal norms than the 
Planning Commission criteria to determine eligibility, and covers about 85 percent of the state’s 
population, amounting to 70 million beneficiaries. 
 
Considering that none of their beneficiaries was covered under a health insurance scheme until 
2007, RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri, along with the other recent government-sponsored health 
insurance schemes in India, have contributed to a massive scale-up of health insurance coverage 
for bottom-of-the-pyramid beneficiaries. The bottom-up design for expansion of health coverage, 
starting with coverage of the poor first, and the rapid scale-up of population coverage in a short 
period of time, are unique facets of the “India story” on beneficiaries. 
 
The NRHM beneficiaries, in theory, can include anyone walking into a public health facility, 
regardless of income, geography, or other factors, so no specific enrolment is required to receive 
NRHM benefits. However, in practice, the scheme does strive to improve equity, and the focus is 
on the rural population and on primary care, irrespective of any economic, social, religious, or 
cultural barriers. The richer segments of the population are less likely to seek primary care from 
public health facilities (except from some prestigious tertiary institutions). However, some public 
health activities under NRHM can create their own community-level lists, such as lists of 
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pregnant women, children, tuberculosis patients, and couples eligible for contraception use, for 
implementation and monitoring of public health interventions. NRHM does not need or use any 
separate eligibility or enrolment system, except for certain schemes such as Janani Suraksha 
Yojana, which are aimed at the BPL population. For such cases, NRHM also relies on the 
standard BPL identification documents. 
 
Enrolment 
 
Of these three programs, enrolment particularly receives attention from RSBY, which requires its 
beneficiaries to be specifically enrolled, and has created a systematic, technology-intensive 
enrolment process. Village-level enrolment camps are organized by the program’s insurance 
industry intermediaries over a period of three to four months every year, in each implementing 
district. The RSBY enrolment stations are a combination of enrolment, correction of personal 
information in the BPL lists (where necessary), photographing family members, registration of 
biometric information, and issuance of corresponding smartcards. The enrolment station is 
organized at a public location and a local health worker or other government official is involved 
in authenticating the issuance of smart cards. A token fee of 30 rupees (about US$0.6) is also 
collected from each family every year, although this contribution does not accrue toward the 
fully government-subsidized insurance premium. 
 
The smart cards are the identification documents required under the scheme for using hospital 
services, with no exceptions. Upon enrolment using biometric and photographic identifiers, each 
family receives a smart card, which encodes the biometric details provided by the enrolled 
members of the family. The entire enrolment process, however, may not happen exactly as 
envisaged. Small studies show that issuance of cards on-the-spot, as per scheme guidelines, is 
not universal, and as many as half of the cards may not be issued at the enrolment site and are 
issued and dispatched subsequently. 
 
The insurance companies contracted to implement RSBY in the district (acting through their 
outsourced service providers such as third-party administrators or smart card agencies) are also 
tasked with enrolment, acting in close coordination with local health workers and district 
administration officials. Insurers have an incentive to enroll as many eligible families as possible 
because their premium-based income is derived from the number of cards issued. The insurers 
also do not have the flexibility to reject any eligible beneficiary who presents for enrolment. 
 
In Rajiv Aarogyasri, the enrolment is automatic for the BPL cardholders of the state and for 
others who are similarly eligible, based on existing state databases of these beneficiaries. There 
is no specific enrolment process nor is any enrolment fee required. Any newly eligible 
beneficiaries can receive coverage through applying for the update of the BPL list (or other 
eligible lists). BPL identification cards and scheme-specific health cards issued by the insurer are 
equally valid as identification documents for the beneficiaries reaching out to the scheme health 
camps9 and networked hospitals. 
                                                                
9 Several government-sponsored health insurance companies organize ‘health camps’, which are outreach activities 
undertaken with support from hospitals and often also with support from the local government officials. These 
health camps involve free consultation and treatment of common health conditions, as also medical screening for 
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6. Innovations in Public Financial Management Associated with these Programs 
 
NRHM is testimony to the fact that the Indian Ministry of Health has been able to convince the 
Indian Ministry of Finance to create significant flexibility in financial management rules for the 
public health system. As mentioned, the financial autonomy to retain and flexibly spend funds at 
public health facilities is unprecedented in the country’s public financial management system. 
Creation of “health societies” bypassing the treasury mechanism, performance-based payments 
to ASHA workers, creating flexible pools of budgetary funds rather than strict line-item budgets, 
decentralized planning linked to budget allocation, and other such aspects of NRHM are also 
associated with a change in the usual public financial management practices. Historically, several 
of these innovations were tried earlier within the national disease control programs or at the state 
level, and NRHM deserves credit for identifying, mainstreaming, and upscaling these 
innovations on a large, national canvas. 
 
The GSHISs take this argument for innovations in public financial management another step 
forward. Much of the eventual GSHIS expenditure is on private hospitals, based on actual 
outputs produced by them. This scale (millions of hospitalization episodes every year) at which 
GSHISs have enabled the purchasing of health services from the private sector is perhaps equally 
unprecedented in the health sector, where several partnerships with the private sector have not 
been successful in translating the achievement of public objectives through private providers. 
The shift from input-financing to output-based payments is no mean feat, either. 
 
A lot more, however, needs to be done. Despite the financial innovations in NRHM, not much 
progress has been made toward performance-based payments or alignment of incentives for 
mainstream health sector workers, whose salaries and wages account for the largest share of the 
public health expenditure pie. Budgets bear little or no relation to volume, quality, or efficiency 
of care. Unless part of a GSHIS network, public facilities do not face potentially helpful market 
pressures, such as the need to be responsive to the demands of patients or to seek efficiencies. 
Staffing and budget norms restrict managers’ freedom to take decisions aimed at improving 
quality or achieving efficiency. In effect, in such a system, hospital managers have little 
decision-making authority over inputs, including hiring, firing, rewarding, or disciplining of 
staff, while accountabilities for performance are diffuse at best (Das et al. 2012; La Forgia and 
Couttolenc 2008; Preker and Harding 2003). 
 
As mentioned in the first section of this case study, a debate continues over investments in 
traditional input-based health spending for publicly managed health facilities versus demand-side 
financing, purchasing of care, and involving private providers and intermediaries in delivering 
services financed by public money. Related to the debate over demand and supply financing, an 
emerging issue involves linkages between these schemes and the public delivery system. The 
expansion of GSHISs has resulted in some friction within state governments regarding the 
expansion of the schemes versus investing in the public delivery system.10 Most GSHISs are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
ailments that can subsequently be catered under the health insurance scheme. Increasing scheme awareness and 
utilization are the key objectives for these health camps. 
10 NRHM financing is mostly directed to the primary care level, including small rural hospitals known as 
Community Health Centers. District-level secondary hospitals are mainly dependent on state financing, which has 
not been adequate in most cases. 
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only marginally linked to the public delivery system, which accentuates the dichotomy. 
Empaneled private facilities outnumber public facilities in nearly all scheme networks, and a 
majority of beneficiaries choose private facilities when seeking care (La Forgia and Nagpal 
2012), even though the share of public facilities is not insignificant and appears to be increasing 
in several states. 
 
7. Management of the Benefits Packages 
 
Although the benefits package under NRHM is not explicitly specified, it is determined by what 
is funded under NRHM and to the extent it is augmented with state government’s own resources. 
In theory, the public health system of the country does provide comprehensive, full-spectrum 
health services, and is open to everyone. However, it is also a fact that an overwhelming 80 
percent of ambulatory care and as much as 60 percent of inpatient care continues to be obtained 
outside the public health system. In this context, the focus of NRHM funds continues to be on 
primary care and public health interventions, with some funding for secondary care and virtually 
none for tertiary care. 
 
One of the largest (in terms of resources) components in NRHM is the Janani Suraksha Yojana, 
whose aim is to incentivize institutional births, which is a large component of the NRHM outlay. 
In addition to free institutional maternity services offered across the country, Janani Suraksha 
Yojana offers a conditional cash transfer to poor women, with incentives also provided to health 
workers, called ASHAs- Accredited Social Health Activists, accompanying the mother. The 
National Rural Health Mission also provides for capital investments to create and expand access 
to emergency obstetric care. A safe blood transfusion infrastructure is also being created under 
the National AIDS Control Program. Several state governments are investing their own resources 
in creating such infrastructure. 
 
RSBY covers inpatient care episodes (except a specified negative list), limited only by its cap of 
30,000 rupees per family per year, which essentially means that the focus is on secondary 
inpatient care. In contrast, Rajiv Aarogyasri covers a list of 938 hospitalization procedures, 
largely tertiary and some secondary, mostly surgical, as a positive list of services covered by the 
scheme. 
 
The evolution of this prominence of inpatient care and other characteristics of this benefits 
package in the RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri programs responds to several factors (La Forgia and 
Nagpal 2012). 
 
First, the health insurance sector, particularly insurers and large private hospitals in the insurer’s 
networks, have considerable experience catering to insured patients for inpatient care. Second, 
hospitals and insurers were familiar with the “package rate” provider-payment mechanism for 
inpatient care currently used by all GSHISs. Third, preauthorization and other control systems 
for inpatient claims had already been developed by the private insurers, and the third-party 
administrators employed by them, mainly because private health insurance products were (and 
continue to be) focused predominantly on inpatient services. Fourth, inpatient care was seen as a 
major cause of financial burden for the poor, even when provided by public hospitals. Fifth, state 
policy makers who played an important role in the design of these schemes considered 
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purchasing surgical and tertiary care services from the private sector a priority due to limitations 
of public supply, particularly public hospital infrastructure and specialized human resources.11  
 
Sixth, some states (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and other states currently in the planning 
stages) designed their tertiary-focused health insurance schemes in part to address equity and 
access shortcomings of the system of discretionary sickness grants provided by chief ministers of 
the states for high-cost health care. Finally, the potential moral hazard issues related to demand-
side financing for ambulatory care (which the country’s private health insurance sector is still 
struggling to cover) and the relative inexperience of both government and insurers in purchasing 
ambulatory care services have contributed to widespread reluctance to offer wider insurance 
coverage for primary care. Notably, the only two comprehensive health insurance schemes in 
India, the Employee State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and the Central Government Health Scheme 
(CGHS), deliver ambulatory care mainly through their captive facilities, partly to control 
utilization and also to serve as a gatekeeper for hospitalization. 
 
Interestingly, the trio of schemes discussed in this case study has their areas of focus clearly 
marked out—primary care in the case of NRHM, secondary care in the case of RSBY, and 
tertiary care in the case of Rajiv Aarogyasri. Though this distinction in focus was due to their 
respective evolutionary factors, and did not happen in a planned manner, a very interesting 
complementarity exists. Thus, if these programs could further evolve to a state of close 
coordination and similarly defined populations to be covered, and with smooth linkages, they 
might actually contribute to more seamless, comprehensive coverage for primary, secondary, and 
tertiary care, drawing upon their respective strengths. 
 
A related question is the priority of choice between investments in primary and inpatient care, 
especially when resources are limited. Although the inpatient schemes (RSBY and Rajiv 
Aarogyasri) reduce the financial burden for hospitalizations, whether they address the overall 
financial burden due to ill health experienced by the poor is an open question. Clearly, an 
inpatient stay would be a catastrophic event for most poor people. However, what would qualify 
as “catastrophic” for the poor household requires more precise definition. For example, 
ambulatory care constitutes a much higher share of overall health expenditure than inpatient care, 
and much of this continues to be out-of-pocket. A chronic ailment requiring regular treatment as 
an outpatient can involve higher expenditures than an inpatient procedure. 
 
Finally, what should be the direction of expansion of benefits packages? As schemes evolve, 
they will face increasing pressure to deepen the benefits package. In Rajiv Aarogyasri (AP), for 
example, the scheme started in a small geographical area, with coverage for expensive, tertiary 
conditions that were among the most common causes for which patients approached the chief 
minister’s discretionary “relief” fund for a grant to cover the cost of care. As the scheme 
expanded geographically, it also deepened the benefits package, adding several hundred new 
procedures, including some secondary procedures. Similarly, after a year of implementation 
experience, RSBY added maternity cover and removed the exclusion for HIV/AIDS. The 
evolution of benefits packages is an ongoing process in response to sociopolitical demands, 
claim experience (and ideally, actuarial analyses), and the availability of financial resources. 
                                                                
11 Sufficient primary care was considered available from the public sector, including that supported by NRHM, but 
that is not necessarily so. Supply varies widely among and within states. 
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Choices will also have to be made between expansion of population coverage versus deepening 
of the benefits package. By restricting the number of BPL families eligible for enrolment to the 
number as per Planning Commission estimates, costs are again controlled by RSBY. The state of 
Andhra Pradesh, however, will soon face the evolutionary choice for Rajiv Aarogyasri between, 
targeted deeper benefits versus more universal coverage but with a more limited benefits 
package. 
 
8. Information Environment of the Health Care Programs  
 
All three schemes included in this study make extensive use of technology to improve their 
information environment, in terms of both collecting information for monitoring the scheme and 
of disseminating information to consumers. 
 
Leveraging Technology for Information Management 
 
Rajiv Aarogyasri makes such extensive use of IT (information technology) solutions as to set it 
apart from other health schemes in India. The scheme is largely paperless; all operational 
processes are electronic and integrated with a web-enabled management information system. 
About 5,000 users are on the system, and officials manage their roles using digital signatures. 
The information system is the only way to process every stage in the operational process—from 
document submission to internal processing and final payment of claims through electronic fund 
transfer systems. Operational process timelines are monitored in real time. These processes 
include internal controls and several innovations for fraud mitigation. 
 
RSBY also ensures offline authorization of hospital admissions using information stored in a 
secure chip contained in the scheme’s identification document—the smart card. The information 
subsequently travels to the servers of scheme intermediaries in batches, as and when connectivity 
is available.12 Claims are similarly designed to be paperless, and claim information flows 
electronically from hospitals to insurers, and from them to the State Nodal Agency and the 
MOLE. 
  
Though not as closely dependent on electronic flow and processing of data for its operations as 
the two programs described above, NRHM has also taken early steps toward automation of 
processes and reporting systems. It has facilitated electronic submission of performance data and 
financial reports by providing computer systems and human resources to run these systems at the 
district and block (subdistrict) level, and is rolling out a web-based Health Management 
Information System application software for online data capture at district and sub-district levels 
on RCH service delivery indicators. It also runs an IT-enabled mother-and-child tracking system 
pilot, besides using several innovations in the flow of financial management information at all 
levels. However, data flows continue to be scanty and not always used for planning or 
monitoring (Planning Commission 2012). 
 
 
                                                                
12 This is usually required at least once in every 24 hours, which updates hospital transactions on the central server. 
Thus, hospital-level authorization can continue in an offline manner, even when there are expected or unexpected 
breaches in electricity and Internet connectivity. 
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Using Information for Scheme Evolution 
 
GSHISs have also been able to use the information flowing to them for undertaking remedial 
actions. For example, claim systems of insurers serving RSBY compile utilization data and 
transmit it to the State Nodal Agencies and MOLE. Information mined from these data has been 
analyzed to monitor scheme performance and make midcourse corrections, such as: 
 
• Hospitals showing unusual utilization patterns are kept under close watch or investigated. 
• Change in scheme design features have been undertaken based on data analysis. 
• Creation of new package codes for procedures hitherto unlisted and subject to case-to-
case authorization. 
 
Areas for Improving Information on Scheme Performance 
 
There is no regular system of inspections or surprise visits in most schemes, although NRHM 
does conduct periodical “common review missions,” which also involve development partners. 
Hospital inspections are frequently undertaken by GSHISs in response to complaints, grievances, 
or unusual trends in data. While micro-studies exist for RSBY, Rajiv Aarogyasri, and NRHM, 
and a systematic impact evaluation is also ongoing for Rajiv Aarogyasri and is shortly planned 
for RSBY, no impact evaluation of any of these programs is presently available. 
 
Consumer Awareness and Information Dissemination 
 
An important institutional responsibility of these programs is to provide information to their 
beneficiaries to enable them to better manage their interactions with the scheme, and to take a 
more active role in their treatment and recovery. These interactions can include a number of 
areas, including enrolment, provider selection and access, treatment choices, access to follow-up 
care, dealing with illegitimate provider charges, and navigation of grievance and complaint 
processes. 
 
Information disclosure is particularly relevant in the Indian context in which beneficiaries 
generally receive little information about providers, treatment options, and costs when involved 
in an illness episode or a care-seeking decision. This lack of information is compounded by 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and caste differences between beneficiaries and providers, leading to 
nearly absolute deference of patients to providers. The performance-based voluntary workers, 
ASHAs (under NRHM), and the specialized cadre of Rajiv Aarogyasri field workers, known as 
arogyamithras, are examples of efforts to provide beneficiaries with information on their benefits 
and to assist them in accessing providers in a timely matter. 
 
HCPs need to strengthen and, in most cases, formalize, systems to help beneficiaries understand 
their rights and responsibilities within the schemes, access and navigate scheme providers, track 
and monitor member contacts, deal with routine issues (for example, change of address, lost 
cards, change of BPL or enrolment status, issuance or reissuance of identification cards due to 
new dependent or death), register complaints, and resolve problems and questions. Some of these 
best practices that could be adopted and/or strengthened by the HCPs include the following: 
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• Outreach and member education. Schemes need to provide general information on how the 
scheme works, what the benefits are, how beneficiaries can best use the scheme, and how to 
access information, and on other practical matters related to the insurance. Many schemes in 
India perform this function through camps. Other vehicles include village-based group 
information sessions, newsletters, websites, village theaters, and radio spots. Schemes can 
also launch a mobile-phone-based outreach program, which has the advantage of allowing 
beneficiaries to ask questions. 
• Routine access to and provision of information. Beneficiaries need a “gateway” to the 
scheme to help them with any concerns or questions. In the Indian context, where mobile 
phone use is widespread, this is best achieved through a toll-free hotline. The Rajiv 
Aarogyasri call center handles millions of inbound and outbound calls every year, and is an 
important tool used for scheme information and communication. 
• Complaints, grievances, data collection, and analysis. The consumer information department 
could also work in tandem with the existing grievance redress machinery of these programs 
and be responsible for the collection, collation, and analysis of all beneficiary contacts with 
the scheme including levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, complaints or compliments, and 
any problem related to a medical service or administrative process. This information can be 
complemented by beneficiary surveys to gauge patient satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and 
these inputs used to inform scheme design and evolution. 
• Quality-of-care measurement and dissemination. Providing information on quality of care is 
arguably the most difficult task facing these programs due to the general lack of quality 
information in India and the absence of institutional arrangements to measure and compare 
quality across health care providers. In the absence of these arrangements in India, as 
mentioned, the schemes themselves will have to initiate their own programs to measure and 
disseminate information on the quality of care in their hospital network.  
 
9. Putting it All Together – Fragmented Expansion or Promising Foundation 
 
This section continues the discussion with a forward-looking perspective. It describes the 
specific challenges and opportunities facing these programs, and then discusses the issues around 
the apparent dichotomy of supply- and demand-side financing and how these programs can build 
better linkages with each other and the wider public health system, particularly with the aim of 
strengthening primary care. 
 
The Nuts and Bolts: Operational Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Programs such as RSBY have made a promising start, but they need to strengthen their 
managerial capacity at all levels, especially at the central level, and with a focus on better 
monitoring of the contracted insurers and hospitals. All the programs would need to focus on 
their service providers so that they are held responsible for productivity, efficiency, quality of 
care, and patient satisfaction. Further, the demand-side financing programs including RSBY and 
Rajiv Aarogyasri may need to revisit their benefits package and create and explore reforms in 
provider payment mechanisms. 
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Successful coverage extension requires robust enrolment processes and targeting mechanisms, 
and the latter are outside the control of the health programs in the Indian context. The targeting 
errors of the BPL lists, particularly in terms of leakage to unintended beneficiaries, combined 
with expansion of state-generated BPL lists to include the nonpoor, raise important equity 
questions about the allocation of scarce government resources. However, the National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS 2009) estimates that 77 percent 
of the country’s population is poor or vulnerable. Most of these vulnerable, non-poor households 
would be potentially impoverished by the need for expensive acute or chronic care. This may 
justify extension of health protection mechanisms to a wider group beyond the BPL population, 
within the country’s fiscal resources. 
 
Simple eligibility requirements, innovative outreach mechanisms, and use of smart technologies 
have facilitated enrolment, allowing schemes to better reach targeted beneficiaries. In the case of 
RSBY, which requires specific enrolment, intermediaries may still have a disincentive to enroll 
distant, hard-to-reach populations and BPL families residing in villages with low BPL density. 
RSBY can improve its enrolment performance by aligning incentives of enrolment 
intermediaries to reach out to more members per household (currently averaging about three 
members enrolled per family while the scheme provides for up to five members) and more 
households in each village (with current enrolment performance indicating that about half of the 
eligible families in the covered district were successfully enrolled). Lack of awareness and 
information about the programs remains a major impediment to enrolment in GSHISs, despite a 
number of outreach measures, and is another area where the programs can take due action. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation is an area that needs focus by all three schemes. Rajiv Aarogyasri has 
an ongoing impact evaluation, as does RSBY in some states. The RSBY may need to revive its 
earlier plan to have a uniform nationwide claims data reporting and analysis system. Similar 
efforts by NRHM to improve the automation of data reporting and to undertake systematic 
impact evaluations of specific interventions would also be very important. 
 
Gazing at the Crystal Ball: Fragmented Expansion or Promising Foundation 
 
As mentioned in the section on benefits packages, the trio of programs discussed in this case 
study have their areas of focus clearly marked out—primary care in the case of NRHM, 
secondary care in the case of RSBY, and tertiary care in the case of Rajiv Aarogyasri. This 
distinction in focus was due to their respective evolutionary factors and did not happen in a 
planned or coordinated manner. Debate continues about whether the country can continue with 
expansion on both the supply and demand side in the long term, the prioritization of investments 
between primary and inpatient care, and between the extension of population coverage versus 
expansion of the benefits package, especially when resources are limited. 
 
Despite the apparent dichotomy in financing as well as the apparent fragmentation among these 
three programs, the potential for an interesting complementarity does exist. Thus, if these 
programs could further evolve to a state of close coordination and with smooth linkages, they 
could potentially contribute to seamless, comprehensive coverage for primary, secondary, and 
tertiary care, drawing upon their respective strengths and synergies. There is considerable scope, 
for example, of NRHM-strengthened primary care facilities serving as effective gatekeepers for 
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the secondary and tertiary health insurance programs, and also contributing to effective follow-
up care after these patients are discharged. 
 
Further, preventive interventions and effective case management for noncommunicable diseases 
at the primary care level can contribute significantly to reducing the need for hospitalization, 
thereby simultaneously improving quality of life for the beneficiaries and containing the costs of 
hospitalization programs. Also, lessons from the demand-side financing schemes in aligning 
facility-level incentives for inpatient care can be used to introduce a performance-based 
remuneration system for public facilities providing primary care.13 If these programs can be 
coordinated in this manner for future expansion plans, their current configuration could be a 
promising foundation for a reformed health finance and delivery system, catapulting forward 
India’s march toward Universal Health Coverage. 
  
                                                                
13 For further details on a proposed model to achieve such linkages, building upon the current configuration of the 
country’s health system, see La Forgia and Nagpal (2012). 
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Annex 1 General Overview of the Health System and Health Financing in India 
 
As discussed in the main text, public spending on health in India as a percent of GDP has varied 
little between 2000 and 2010, hovering at about 1 percent. Government (central, state, and local) 
has been the source of about one-fifth of spending, while out-of-pocket payments represented 
about 70 percent—one of the highest percentages in the world.14 Figure A1.1 depicts financial 
flows among major actors in India’s health service system according to the national health 
accounts classification, categorized by sources, agents, and providers. The bolded arrows show 
the main financial flows.15 
 
Figure A1.1 Financial Flows in India’s Health System, circa 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: National Health Accounts for 2004–05 (MOHFW 2009) and authors’ estimates from La Forgia and Nagpal 
2012. 
Note: *Includes spending by other central ministries. **Includes spending by local governments (1 percent of total 
spending).  
 
The largest source of health financing in India is out-of-pocket spending by households (71 
percent as a source of spending, and 69 percent as a financing intermediary for out-of-pocket 
spending). Nearly all this out-of-pocket spending is directed to fee-for-service private providers, 
but some is also spent for user fees and incidental expenses (for nonavailable drugs, for instance) 
at public facilities. This method of finance places considerable financial burden on poor 
                                                                
14 Among Asian countries, this was exceeded only by Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan in 2008 
(WHO 2010). 
15 The published National Health Accounts data contain certain inaccuracies, which has resulted in both an 
overestimate and an underestimate of spending. For example, social insurance was placed as a financing source 
rather than firms and households which actually contribute the financing for social health insurance. Also, some 
very small sources have not been depicted in this figure, so the totals for sources do not add up to 100 percent. 
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households, and is seen as one of the important reasons for impoverishment in India. As much as 
80 percent of outpatient and 60 percent of inpatient care is provided by private practitioners 
(National Sample Survey Organisation, 60th round data) (MSPI 2004). This translates into a 
flow of 77 percent of total health spending directed toward private providers (including 
charitable and other nonprofit facilities). 
 
Tax-financed, direct public delivery formed 20 percent of total health spending in the last year 
for which formal National Health Accounts are available. This public delivery of health services 
is, in principle, available for all of India’s population at free or near-free pricing. Also, the share 
of public health expenditure has gone up to some extent in recent years with the introduction of 
NRHM (which is increasingly a large component of these funds), and estimates suggest that this 
may account for more than 25 percent of total health spending now, with out-of-pocket payments 
reduced to that extent. 
 
Operated mainly by the states, the public delivery system includes facilities at primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels, and accounts for about 20 and 40 percent of outpatient and 
inpatient utilization in the country, respectively. Considerable interstate variation exists, 
especially in inpatient utilization (Mahal et al. 2002) and there are significant subnational 
disparities across various dimensions of vulnerability. The publicly financed, owned, and 
delivered health service is also the largest health sector subsystem, where each state runs its own 
providers and infrequently purchases services from others. In theory, this system is available to 
all residents and is either free or at highly subsidized prices for health services. Public hospitals 
include Primary Health Centres and Community Health Centres at the primary level; Sub-
District and District Hospitals at the secondary level; and Public Medical Colleges and their 
affiliated hospitals, and some autonomous specialty institutions, at the tertiary level. Though 
higher facilities are designated as referral facilities, the gatekeeping and referral systems are not 
strong, and even tertiary hospitals receive a large number of primary care cases in their 
outpatient facilities. 
 
Social insurance schemes for formal private sector workers, civil servants, and military and 
railway employees constituted 4.1 percent of spending. These schemes are mandatory, and most 
are financed through employee and employer contributions via a payroll tax, but also receive 
partial government subsidies. Others are fully subsidized by the government (for example, 
military, railways) or public corporations (for example, coal and oil parastatals). Beneficiaries 
seek care in facilities owned and operated by the schemes or contracted out to the private sector. 
Private voluntary health insurance emerged in the late 1980s but has grown rapidly in the 2000s. 
 
In 2004–05, (for which the latest country-produced National Health Accounts are available), 
private voluntary health insurance accounted for 1.6 percent of total health expenditure but, by 
2008–09, it had reached an estimated 3 percent. Private insurance companies’ health products 
emphasize inpatient coverage provided in networked private hospitals. The market consists of 
two, roughly equal-size components: a group market (catering to employers) and a retail market 
comprising individual and family plans. In 2010, private voluntary health insurance covered 
about 60 million people or 5 percent of the population. 
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Annex 2 Evolutionary Context for the Indian HCPs: Health Impact, 
Public Health Expenditure, and Using Insurance Intermediaries 
 
Health Outcomes and Public Health Expenditure are not Commensurate with National 
Income 
 
India is significantly below its global comparators in terms of public expenditure on health as a 
share of GDP among countries with similar levels of income (GDP per capita in current U.S. 
dollars). At India’s current income level, most countries exhibit higher public spending on health 
as a share of their GDP (World Bank 2010). Figure A2.1 illustrates this situation on a log scale in 
which each circle represents a country. The countries in South Asia have been labeled for ease of 
comparison. 
 
Figure A2.1 India and Comparators: Public Expenditures on Health 
as a Share of GDP and in Relation to Income Per Capita, 2008 
 
Sources: World Bank 2010; WHO 2010. 
Note: X-axis log scale. 
 
 
India also falls short in terms of health impact, which also raises concerns around the 
effectiveness of its health expenditure. Although it has achieved laudable annual percent 
reductions in infant mortality over the last decade, some of its neighbors, such as Bangladesh and 
Nepal, have achieved steeper declines (Deolalikar et al. 2008). India has gained less ground in 
reducing malnutrition, maternal mortality, adult mortality, and prevalence of communicable 
diseases than its neighbors. In relation to its income level and total health spending per capita, 
India has not performed as well as its comparators on lowering maternal mortality, and its 
performance is just about average for infant mortality (figure A2.2) (World Bank 2010).  Huge 
disparities in health outcomes are still evident across states and social groups (for example, 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes), and improvements have not been shared equally. 
  
PakistanBangladesh
Afghanistan
Nepal
Bhutan
Maldives
Sri LankaIndia
5
10
15
Pu
bl
ic 
he
al
th
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
(%
 o
f G
DP
)
100 250 1000 10000 25000
GDP per capita (current US$)
Sources: WDI; WHO
Note: x-axis log scale
Public Health Expenditure as Share of GDP versus Income per Capita (2008)
22 
 
Figure A2.2 India and Comparators: Infant Mortality and Maternal Mortality 
in Relation to Expenditures on Health and Income Per Capita, 2008 
 
Sources: WHO 2010; World Bank 2010. 
Note: X-axis log scale. 
 
Low public health spending, a high out-of-pocket share of 69 percent (MOHFW 2009), and the 
resultant health insecurity have been the main drivers of calls for government funding of health 
services for the poor. Selvaraj and Karan (2009), based on National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO) data (MSPI 2004), estimate that nearly 39 million people were pushed into poverty by 
out-of-pocket payments for health care during 2004 compared to 26 million during 1993–94. 
Applying a different methodology to the NSSO data, Berman et al. (2010) estimate that 63 
million individuals (11.9 million households) were pushed below the poverty line by health care 
expenditure in 2004. These figures represented 6.2 percent of all households (6.6 percent in rural 
areas and 5 percent in urban areas). 
 
Households, on average, devote about 5.8 percent of their total expenditure to health care. Health 
accounts for about 10.5 percent of nonfood expenditure. Approximately 14 percent of 
households in rural areas and 12 percent in urban areas spend more than 10 percent of their total 
annual consumption expenditure on health care (MSPI 2004). Countries such as Sri Lanka do 
much better, while China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam do worse than India on this count. A 
comparison of household spending on health for selected countries in Asia is shown in figure 
A2.3. 
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Figure A2.3 India and Comparators: Household Spending on Health 
(Percent of nonfood and total expenditures) 
 
Source: Van Doorslaer et al. 2005 
 
In this context, the National Health Policy (MOHFW 2002), the report of the National 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (MOHFW 2005b), and the current coalition 
government’s framework for governance (“common minimum program”) (Government of India 
2004), have all articulated the need for raising public health spending as a share of GDP, and 
catalyzed the introduction of the programs discussed in this case study. This commitment has 
been confirmed in recent government pronouncements related to the preparation of the 12th five-
year development plan (2012–17) (Planning Commission 2011). However, the Government of 
India has yet to deliver on pledges for significant increases in public financing for health (aimed 
to be more than doubled to 2 to 3 percent of GDP), at least through the public delivery system. 
 
The new generation (post-2007) of Government Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes (GSHISs), 
exemplified by RSBY and Rajiv Aarogyasri in this case study, and now comprising over a dozen 
such schemes nationwide, are a new form of mobilizing government resources in an 
underfinanced system while pioneering a new set of design features and institutional 
arrangements to govern, allocate, and manage the use of these resources. Though still small in 
terms of the share of public financing, these GSHISs introduced a number of significant changes 
in traditional government health financing and delivery arrangements in India. They have 
established a demand-side mechanism that mobilizes and channels additional public financing to 
health, introduced an explicit benefits package, pioneered cashless care (for example, there are 
no point-of-service payments or other forms of cost sharing required from beneficiaries and the 
hospital charges are directly settled by the schemes with their network hospitals), fostered 
public-private partnerships (with insurers and providers), and in principle stimulated competition 
among insurers (for government contracts) and providers (for beneficiaries, when ill). 
 
Prior to the appearance of these schemes, nearly all public financing was directed to government-
owned-and-operated service providers to support an implicit but irregularly (at best) delivered 
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benefits package. Although services were nominally free in most cases, users faced costs for 
unavailable drugs and consumables, transportation, diagnostics, and other services, as well as 
possible informal payments in some cases (La Forgia and Nagpal 2012). 
 
The insurance intermediaries used by the newer GSHISs have provided an effective and 
transparent mechanism for these publicly funded schemes to buy services for their low-income 
beneficiaries from private health care providers, at a scale, amounting to a few million 
hospitalization episodes per year, which is also unprecedented in the Indian context. Prior to the 
evolution of this arrangement, purchasing of privately provided health services using public 
funds has been fraught with numerous hurdles, including leakages, delayed payments, and 
misaligned incentives. 
 
The GSHISs are now deeply engaged with the network of private providers created by their 
insurance intermediaries from the private health insurance industry. This has allowed 
beneficiaries a broader choice of hospitals and also created some competition among providers, 
including public providers, with broader health sector impact, as has been discussed in an earlier 
section of this case study. Providers are held accountable for service provision (or they do not get 
paid). In theory, patient choice of providers further contributes to accountability. The explicit 
entitlement evident in the new generation of insurance schemes has established a new and more 
binding compact between government and citizens. Though limited in scope, benefits and the 
service delivery system to which they have access are clearly defined. In addition, the purchaser-
provider split shifts provider payments from inputs to outputs and creates an enabling 
environment for increased accountability for results. 
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Annex 3 Summary of Salient Characteristics 
of the Government-Sponsored Health Insurance Schemes 
 
Factors Rajiv Aarogyasri Community 
Health Insurance Scheme (AP) 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, RSBY 
(GOI / MOLE) 
Launch year 2007 2008 
Geographic area Entire state of Andhra Pradesh Pan India: Currently implemented in 26 states 
Target / eligible population BPL or annual family income 
below Rs. 75,000 
BPL families and other targeted groups 
 
Number of beneficiaries 
 
20.4 million families, 70 million 
beneficiaries 
33.4 million families, 100 million beneficiaries 
Unit of enrolment Family  Family 
Benefits package Inpatient, tertiary focus; 938 
identified procedures and follow-
up packages covered 
Inpatient lower-cost, secondary care focus; maternity 
also covered 
Maximum insurance 
coverage 
Rs. 150,000 per family per year 
plus buffer of Rs. 50,000 per year 
Rs. 30,000 per family per year 
Hospital empanelment, 
minimum beds 
50 beds  10 beds 
Number of empaneled 
hospitals (government and 
private) 
275 private and 150 government 
hospitals 
12,538 hospitals (8,546 private and 3,992 public) 
Sources of funds State government (100 percent, 
through the health budget and 
through a levy on alcohol sales in 
the state 
Central government 75 percent, state government 25 
percent, but in some states, it is 90 percent from 
center. A contribution of Rs. 30 per family per year 
is collected from beneficiaries, which is used for 
administration and IEC expenses 
Total expenditure, 2009–10 
(millions of Rs.) 
  
Rs. 12,000  Rs. 3,500  
Premium price, 2009–10 Rs. 439 per family (varies 
between phases and districts) 
Average: Rs. 540 per family per year including 
service tax 
Number of hospitalizations 
per year 
319,446, 2009–10 400,000, 2009–10 
Hospitalization frequency 
(2009–10) 
0.6 percent per beneficiary 2.5 percent per beneficiary 
Governing agency / legal 
status 
Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust / 
trust  
State nodal agency (society/ trust) 
Executing agency Trust  State nodal agency with the intermediation of 
commercial insurer(s) 
Number of staff in 
governing agency (2010) 
117 ~10 at center and  
~100 at state nodal agencies 
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Annex 4 Spider Web 
I. Outcomes comparisons: 
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
IMR: Infant mortality rate (2010). U5MR: Under-5 mortality rate (2010). Stunting:  prevalence of low height-for-age among children under 5 (2010). MMR: Maternal 
mortality rate (2010) per 100 000 live  births. Adult mortality: Adult mortality rate per 1000 male adults (2010). [100-(life expectancy)]: Life expectancy at birth 
(2010) subtracted from maximum of 100. Neonatal mortality: Neonatal mortality per 1000 living births.  CD as cause of death: Communicable diseases as cause of 
death (% total). All data from World Bank's World Development Indicators. Income averages for stunting calculated by Bank staff and are unweighted. 
Note on interpretation:
In this plot ‘higher’ is ‘worse’ – since
these indicators are positive measures
of mortality / morbidity. Life
expectancy is converted to be an
inverse measure.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to the
average lower middle income country
value.
The table below summarizes outcome
comparisons with the average lower
middle income country (LMIC).
II. Inputs comparisons
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
THE as % of GDP: Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) (2010). Hospital bed density: Hospital beds per 1,000 people (latest available year). Physician density: Physicians 
per 1,000 people (latest available year). Nurse/midwife density: Nurses and midwives per 1,000 people (latest available year). GHE as % of THE/10: Public health 
expenditure (% of total expenditure on health)  (2010). All data from World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Note on interpretation:
This plot shows indicators which
measure spending on health or the
number of health workers per
population.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to
the average lower middle income
country value.
The table below summarizes inputs
comparisons with the average lower
middle income country (LMIC).
27 
 
III. Coverage comparisons
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
DPT immunization: % of children aged 12-23 months with DPT immunization (2010). Prenatal services: % of pregnant women receiving prenatal care (latest available 
year). Contraceptive prevalence: % of women ages 15-49 using contraception (latest available year). Skilled birth attendance: % of all births attended by skilled health 
staff (latest available year). Improved sanitation: % of population with access to improved sanitation facilities  (2010). TB treatment success: Tuberculosis treatment 
success rate (% of registered cases). All data from World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Note on interpretation:
In this plot ‘higher’ is ‘better’ – since
these indicators are positive
measures. In this case, all are percent
of the population receiving or having
access to a certain health related
service.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to
the average lower middle income
country value.
The table below summarizes
coverage comparisons with the
average lower middle income
country (LMIC).
IV. Infrastructure comparisons
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
Paved roads: % of total roads paved (most recent). Internet users: users per 100 people (2010, with some estimates from prior years). Mobile phone users: mobile 
cellular subscriptions per 100 people (2010). Access to improved water: % of population with access to improved water source (2010).  All data from World Bank's 
World Development Indicators.
Note on interpretation:
In this plot ‘higher’ is ‘better’ – since
these indicators are positive
measures of provision of certain
good / service, and a measure of
urban development.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to
the average lower middle income
country value.
The table below summarizes
infrastructure comparisons with the
average lower middle income
country (LMIC).
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V. Demography comparisons
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
TFR: total fertility rate (births per woman), 2009. Dependency ratio: % of working-age population (2010) aged less than 15 or more than 64. Youth dependency: % of 
working-age population (2010) aged less than 15. Rurality: % of total population in rural areas (2010). All data from World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Note on interpretation:
Indicators here measure births per
woman, the extent of rurality, and
the number of dependents.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to
the average lower middle income
country value.
The table below summarizes
demographic indicators comparisons
with the average lower middle
income country (LMIC).
VI. Inequality comparisons
India and Lower Middle Income Countries
All indicators measure the ratio of prevalence between the  poorest (in Q1, the first wealth distribution quintile) and the richest (in Q5, the fifth wealth distribution 
quintile). The data (latest data available) are taken from HNPstats (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/HNPquintile).
Note on interpretation:
In this plot ‘higher’ is ‘inequal’ and
indicators here measure inequalities
in selected health outcomes by
taking the ratio of prevalence
between Q1 and Q5.
The values on the radar plot have
been standardized with respect to
the average lower middle income
country value.
The table below summarizes
inequality indicators comparisons
with the average lower middle
income country (LMIC).
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The World Bank supports the efforts of countries to share prosperity by 
transitioning toward universal health coverage (UHC) with the objectives of 
improving health outcomes, reducing the financial risks associated with ill 
health, and increasing equity. The Bank recognizes that there are many paths 
toward UHC and does not endorse a particular path or set of organizational or 
financial arrangements to reach it. Regardless of the path chosen, the quality of 
the instruments and institutions countries establish to implement UHC are 
essential to its success. Countries will face a variety of challenges during the 
implementation phase as they strive to expand health coverage.  With that in 
mind, the World Bank launched the Universal Health Coverage Studies Series 
(UNICO Studies Series) to develop knowledge and operational tools designed 
to help countries tackle these implementation challenges in ways that are 
fiscally sustainable and that enhance equity and efficiency. The UNICO Studies 
Series consists of technical papers and country case studies that analyze 
different issues related to the challenges of UHC policy implementation. 
 
The case studies in the series are based on the use of a standardized protocol 
to analyze the nuts and bolts of 27 programs in 25 countries that have 
expanded coverage from the bottom up, starting with the poor and vulnerable. 
The protocol consists of 300 questions designed to elicit a detailed 
understanding of how countries are implementing five sets of policies to 
accomplish the following:  
 
• Manage the benefits package 
• Manage processes to include the poor and vulnerable 
• Nudge efficiency reforms to the provision of care 
• Address new challenges in primary care 
• Tweak financing mechanisms to align the incentives of different stakeholders 
in the health sector 
 
 
 
 
The UNICO Studies Series aims to provide UHC implementers with an expanded toolbox. 
The protocol, case studies and technical papers are being published as part of the Series. A 
comparative analysis of the case studies will be available in 2013.  
 
 
 
